Main Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil"

Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil"

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NOTE ON THE PLAN OF NIETZSCHE'S
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
Leo Strauss

Beyond Good

Evil

and

always seemed to me to

Nietzsche's books. This impression

of

dicted

his

by

judgement, for he

Zarathustra is the

most

the most perfect in

as

the

"most

as

same

to

regard

and

even

To illustrate this partly
too far-fetched, there seems to be
Plato's Republic, his Phaedrus
Yet Plato

fundity

or

no

makes

beauty

is

is

not

regard

to

perhaps not

to the effect that

agreement

his Banquet

in

perfect

his
well

as

beautiful"

an example which

general

and

contra

that

his

are

most

beautiful

necessarily his most profound writings.
distinction among his writings in regard to pro

their

without

by

beautiful

in German

exists

"most

as

most

believe

to

language. But "most

profound"

language."

writings

inclined

was

book that

profound

be the

be thought to be

could

being

or perfection

in

regard

language; he is

to

not concerned

"ipsissimosity"

and hence with Plato's writings,
his
but points away from himself whereas Nietzsche points most emphatically
Nietzsche."
"personally"
to himself, to "Mr.
Now Nietzsche
preferred,
with

not

Plato

with

Beyond Good

Science to
"most

all

"face,"

What is

Evil but his Dawn of

personal,"

or with

dimly
on

being

Beyond Good

and

his

ultimately derivative from the Greek
"personal"
has nothing to do with

"perfect in

perceived

Beyond Good

his account of that book
Good and Evil is the very
Zarathustra in

Morning

Gay

books precisely because these two books are his
books (letter to Karl Knortz of June 21, 1888). As

indicates, being

"profound"

judgement

"

and

other

personal"

the very term

for

his

as
and

much

which

is

language."

he has

through

expressed

our

clearly by Nietzsche in
in Ecce Homo: Beyond

stated
given

"inspired"

the

Zarathustra is
eye

to

inadequately
Evil, is

opposite of

as

Evil the

and
and

regard

word

being

most

compelled to

and

"dithyrambic"

far-sighted,

whereas

in

grasp clearly the nearest,

timely (the present), the around-us. This change of concern required
form,"
the same arbitrary
in every respect, "above all also in the
out of which a Zarathustra had become
from
the
instincts
away
turning
the

possible:
regards

the graceful subtlety as regards

form,

as

regards

intention,

as

the art of silence are in the foreground in Beyond Good and

which amounts to saying that these qualities are not in the foreground
in the Zarathustra, to say nothing of Nietzsche's other books.
In other words, in Beyond Good and Evil, in the only book published
by Nietzsche, in the contemporary preface to which he presents himself

Evil

as the antagonist of

than

anywhere else.

Plato, he

"platonizes"

as regards

the

"form"

more

Interpretation

98
to the

According
mental

that no human

only

for

strive

which

being

wisdom

that gods too

Plato

and

reminded

proper

of

Plato,

nor

and

(cf. Sophist 216b
of

aphorism

ultimate

the fundamental difference
thoughts in their

and

painted

help being

cannot

we

the

after

Socrates

in the

when

underlines

thoughts"

between "written

form,

Evil Nietzsche

not

gods philosophize

And

1-2).

151d

and

Evil

and

a super-Socrates

especially among philosophers,

Yet Diotima is

have thought that

Theaetetus

5-6,

Beyond Good

heart"

Nietzsche divulges

suspect perhaps

philosophize.

could well

the

genius of

Dionysos

god

Beyond Good

of

aphorism

penultimate

the novelty,

preparation

mind

easily be led to Diotima's conclusion
is wise, but only the god is; human beings can
or philosophize; gods do not philosophize (Banquet

Nietzsche delineates "the

is in fact the

who

the pure

of

Evil Plato's funda
and of the good in

and

one can

premise

In the

203e-204a).

in

his invention

was

error

itself. From this

to Beyond Good

preface

Plato

what

says

original

intimates

or

logos"

and regarding the unsayable and
regarding the "weakness of the
a fortiori unwritable character of the truth (Ep. VII 341c-d, 342e-343a):

the purity of the
establish

the

Beyond Good
future."

the
of

liberating

the

Plato

conceives

Evil has the

and

of

it, does

of

subtitle

"Prelude to

a

philosophy

of

the true philosophy, but a new kind of philosophy

by

i.e.

of

mind

from "the

prejudice

the

of

this very fact the book is meant to be a

philosophers,"

At the

specimen of

same

time or

the philosophy

the future. The first chapter ("Of the prejudices of the philosophers")

is followed

by

Nietzsche's

sense

past

but they

a chapter entitled

"The free

free from the

are

of

mind."

prejudice

are not yet philosophers of the

and precursors

of

than the philosophers of the future? do

only

minds

in

future; they

are

the heralds

the philosophy of the future (aph. 44). It is hard to

say how the distinction between the free

possible

The free

the philosophy of the

minds

and

the future is to be understood: are the free minds

is

necessarily

to prepare, not indeed the philosophy

meant

the philosophers of the past (and the present).

by

not

the logos.

The book is

future,

the

as

mind

strength of

during

they

the

by

philosophers of

any

chance

freer

possess an openness which

the transitional period between the philosophy

the philosophy of the future? Be this as it may, philosophy
is surely the primary theme of Beyond Good and Evil, the obvious
theme of the first two chapters.
of

the

past and

The book

The third

chapter is devoted to
("Sayings and Interludes")
does not indicate a subject matter; that chapter is distinguished from
all other chapters by the fact that it consists exclusively of short aphorisms.
The last five chapters are devoted to morals and politics. The book as
religion.

consists of nine chapters.

The

heading

of

the fourth chapter

a whole consists then of two main parts which
another

by

about

123 "Sayings

and

is devoted chiefly to philosophy
morals

and

politics.

Philosophy

Interludes";

and religion
and

are separated

the first

and

of

the second

religion, it seems,

from

one

the two parts

chiefly to

belong

together

Note

Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good

on the

and

Evil

99

belong more closely together than philosophy and the city. (Cf.
Hegel's distinction between the absolute and the objective mind.) The
fundamental alternative is that of the rule of philosophy over religion
or

the rule of religion

Aristotle,
as
a

distinguished from
lower

over

phUosophy; it is not, as it

plane

than

intimates that his

the

classics,

either

Pascal (cf.

religiosus

or

religion.

or

precursor par excellence

but the homo

a philosopher

for Plato

belongs from the outset to
In the preface he
is not a statesman nor even

politics

philosophy

was

life; for Nietzsche,

that of the philosophic and the political

45).

aph.

Nietzsche says very little about religion in the first two chapters.
One could say that he speaks there on religion only in a single aphorism
which happens to be the shortest (37). That aphorism is a kind of

immediately

corollary to the

his intention, the

particular

the

character

thought. But the

from

or seen

to

will

or modification of

the

eros

the

world

takes the place

occupies

in Plato's

Geist). Whatever

reine

the pure

and

to

proposition

within

power

itself"

will

forth in the

sets

compatible with

mind"

mind

according to

takes the place of both

power

philosophizing becomes a mode
most spiritual (der geistigste)

Accordingly

the pure mind.

and

is

striving for "the good in
(der
eros is not "the pure

may be the relation between the
Plato, in Nietzsche's thought the
eros

he

that

his fundamental

of

the

eros

which

manner

according to which life is will to power
is will to power and nothing else. The
which

in

one

preceding

and unambiguous

most straightforward

to power: it is the

will

to power; it consists in prescribing to nature what or how it ought
to be (aph. 9); it is not love of the true that is independent of will or

will

decision. Whereas according to Plato the
according to Nietzsche the impure mind,
mind, is the

Good

and

sole

Evil

source

with

of

pure

mind

or

certain

a

grasps

kind

the
of

truth,

impure

truth. Nietzsche begins therefore Beyond

the questioning of love

of

truth and of truth. If we

may make a somewhat free use of an expression occurring in Nietzsche's
Second Meditation Out of Season, the truth is not attractive, lovable,
life-giving, but deadly, as is shown by the true doctrines of the sovereignty
of

Becoming,

the lack

of

the

of

any

fluidity

cardinal

Schlechta, I 272); it is

of

all

concepts, types

difference between
shown

most

simply

man

by

species, and

of

beast (Werke,

ed

and

and

the true doctrine that

"thing-in-itself,"

"nature"

(aph. 9)
in itself, the
is wholly chaotic and meaningless. Hence all meaning, all order originates
in man, in man's creative acts, in his will to power. Nietzsche's state

God is dead. The

world

(aph. 40).

By

suggesting

deadly, he does his best to break
deadly truth; he suggests that the most important,

the power

ments or suggestions are

deliberately

or

saying that the truth is

of

the

truth

the

truth

say that Nietzsche's

pure

mind

enigmatic

all

truths

the

most

is life-giving. In

regarding
other words, by suggesting that the truth is human creation, he suggests
that this truth at any rate is not a human creation. One is tempted to
comprehensive

creates perishable

truths.

grasps

Resisting

the fact that the impure

that temptation we state

mind

Nietzsche's

Interpretation

100

him in this

following

suggestion

hold

"text"

of the

"discover"

the philosophers tried to

manner:

get

distinguished from "interpretations"; they tried to
"invent."
to
What Nietzsche claims to have realized

as

and not

is that the text in its pure,

form is inaccessible (hke the

unfalsified

Kantian

Thing-in-itself); everything

thought

by

man

the

is in the last

analysis

interpretation. But for this

of

reason

very

concern to

people

the

text, the

us; the

world

world

of

in itself, the true
concern

any

for it is necessarily anthropocentric;

philosopher

anyone

world cannot

be

to us is necessarily a

man

is necessarily in

the measure of ah things (aph. 3 end, 12 end,

a

of

or

any

fiction,
manner

17, 22, 24, 34, 38;

cf.

Plato, Laws 716c 4-6). As is indicated sufficiently by the title of the
book, the anthropocentrism for which Nietzsche opts is transmoral (cf.
aph. 34 and 35 with 32). At first glance there does not seem to be a
connection

35

between the

book

which a

34

grave aphorism

this seems to agree

and

of aphorisms

does

and the

lighthearted

aphorism

impression according to
need not have a lucid and

the general

with

not

have

or

necessary order or may consist of disconnected pieces. The connection
between aphorism 34 and 35 is a particularly striking example of the
lucid, if somewhat hidden, order governing the sequence of the aphor
isms: the

desultory

Nietzsche's

character of

argument

is

more pretended

than real. If the aforesaid is correct, the doctrine of the will to power
cannot claim

is

"only"

many.

reveal what

regards

(aph. 22

the

fact,

the most

presumably the best

this apparent objection as

fundamental fact but

interpretation, among
a confirmation of

his

end).

turn to the two aphorisms in Beyond Good and Evil

can now

I-II that

is,

interpretation,

Nietzsche

proposition

We

to

one

be

said to be devoted to religion (36-37). Aphorism 36
reasoning in support of the doctrine of the will to power.
Nietzsche had spoken of the will to power before, but
only in the way
of bald assertion, not to
say dogmatically. Now he sets forth with what
is at the same time the most intransigent intellectual
probity and the

can

presents the

most

bewitching

playfulness

tempting, hypothetical
he does
than

not

what

know
he

his reasons, i.e. the problematic, tentative,
his proposition. It could seem that

character of

more of the will

says

here. Almost

aphorism of the second chapter

to

power as

fundamental reality

the

immediately before,

(34),

he had drawn

in the

central

our attention to the

fundamental distinction between the world which is of
any concern
to us and the world in itself, or between the world of appearance or
fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text). What he seems
to aim at is the abolition of that
to power

is both the

Precisely

if

will

all

views

of

fundamental distinction: the

any

concern

the world are

to

us and

to all other

and

the

most

i.e.

at the

acts

of

the

same time an

fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction
the necessary and sufficient condition

interpretations, it is

the possibility of any

is

world as will

the world in itself.

interpretations,

to power, the doctrine of the will to power

interpretation
of

world of

"categories."

Note
After
doctrine

Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good

on the

having

tempted

some

his

of

but the devil is

refuted

the contary, my friends!

Beyond Good
150

aph.

"Das Wesen der
of

should not

is

Rehgion,"

soul

not

deal

hitherto

its

and

with unknown

devoted to

manner

"Das

a

of

On

contrary!

to

you

speak

God.

of

of

(Cf.

Morals, Preface Nr. 7.)
Wesen"; it is not entitled
for this

and

yet

rehgion

hitherto
In the

a whole.

its boundaries, to the

inexhausted

being

although

that the

because he deals

or

53-57 to the

58-62)

section

Greeks"

the old

and

above

religion

of

transmits Nietzsche's

on rehgion

all

history

certain

with

are

the future.
appraisal

hitherto he

parts

of

Nietzsche does

the future. Aphorisms 46-52

of

and

whole

possibilities:

tianity (50-51)
of

question

the whole doctrine

one of the reasons

the chapter (aph.

as

Testament'

forces

vindication

Christianity (46-48), then of the Greeks (49),
and finally of the Old Testament

of

the

with

popularly, that

speak

"On the

what

religiose

possibilities,

the

and

rehgion

rest of

rehgion

a

30)

aph.

101

rehgion, that which is common to ah religions, is not or
be of any concern to us. The chapter considers religion with

hitherto

religion

devil,

Genealogy

as

entitled

to the human soul

a view

the

The

is in

as well

chapter

not.

to

replies

the will to power

of

Evil

and

295,

and

The third

essence

And,

The doctrine

popularly?"

He

to the

Evil

makes them raise the

to whether that doctrine does not assert,

as

God is

(cf.

readers

Nietzsche

of the will to power

and

speaks

then again of

of

first

Chris

(52). "The religiosity
of "the Jewish 'Old

"

supply him with the standards by which he judges of
Christianity; nowhere in the chapter does he speak of Christianity with
the respect, the admiration, the veneration with which he speaks of
the two
and on

pre-Christian

The

phenomena.

the Old Testament

are

aphorisms

the Old Greeks

on

to interrupt the aphorisms

meant

obviously
devoted to Christianity; the two interrupting aphorisms are put at some
distance from one another in order to imitate the distance or rather
opposition

between

one

what

devoted to the

call

may

the Old Testament is

aphorism on

Athens

immediately

and

preceded

Jerusalem.

by

The

an aphorism

saints, no holy men in the Old Testa
Old Testament theology in contradistinction

saint: there are no

the peculiarity of
especially to Greek theology is the conception, the creation of the holy
God (cf. Dawn of Morning aph. 68). For Nietzsche "the great
of (certain parts of) the Old Testament shows forth the greatness, not

ment;

style"

God, but

of

man

are

of what man once was:

creatures

Nietzsche's
being: the
the

or

the

will

holy

to

God

no

less than the

holy

power.

God is then atheistic, at least for the time
following that on the Old Testament begins with

vindication of

aphorism

question

possible

of

the human

'Why

today?'

atheism

necessary.

But in the

There

was

meantime

a

time

"God

when

died"

Zarathustra, Zarathustra's Prologue Nr. 3). This does

theism was

(Thus Spoke

not merely mean
in God, for men's unbelief does not
destroy God's life or being. It does mean, however, that even while
God hved he never was what the believers in him thought him to be,

that

men

have

ceased

to believe

Interpretation

102
namely, deathless. Theism

it

as

understood

itself

therefore always

was

true, i.e. powerful, life-giving. In speaking
of how or why it lost its power, Nietzsche speaks here less of the reasons
that swayed him than of the reasons advanced by some of his con
Yet for

wrong.

a

time it

was

temporaries, presumably his
few of his better readers will
directed

are

against natural

the most powerful

directed
i.e.

or revealed

those reasons

argument

theology. Nevertheless

Nietzsche

which

of

decay

European theism Nietzsche has the impression

of

is growing powerfully
Could

phase.

"religiosity"

present

at

belong

atheism

kind

while a certain

distinguished from

as

that

or

atheism

to the free

is only

belongs to the

of non-atheism

a transitional

Nietzsche

as

mind

"religion"

conceives

philosopher

the future who will again worship the god Dionysos or will again

Epicurean

as an

essential

might

say,

to Nietzsche's

character

of

an

a

dionysokolax (cf.

thought;

experiment

or

without

you

wish,

modern
seem

non-theistic

point

by

was anti-Christian

philosophy

to

religiosity

of

be,

7)? This ambiguity
it his doctrine would lose
aph.

temptation.

a

Nietzsche provisionally illustrates his
if

is

sketches

the possibility of a clear and unambiguous revelation,
"speaking"
God's
to man (cf. Dawn of Morning aph. 91 and 95).

that the religious instinct

is
its

a

against

Despite the

it

Not

think that those reasons verge

not quite clear whether

(rational)

anti-theistic

contemporaries.

competent

justifiably

the frivolous. In particular it is

on

of

most

suggestion

of

an

atheistic

or,

the alleged fact that the whole

but

not anti-religious

that it could

to something reminding of the Vedanta philosophy. But

he does not anticipate, he surely does not wish, that the religion of the
future will be something like the Vedanta philosophy. He anticipates a

Western, a sterner, more terrible and more invigorating possibility:
the sacrificing from cruelty, i.e. from the will to power
turning against
more

itself, of God which prepares the worshipping of the stone, stupidity,
heaviness (gravity), fate, the Nothing. He anticipates in other words
that the better
what

they

are

bunking of the
thing infinitely

among the contemporary atheists
"the
may remind us

doing

will

sun

that

,

more

they

will come

come

to

know

Anaxagoras'

stone"

of

de

to realize that there is some

terrible, depressing and degrading in the offing
or I'infdme: the possibility,
nay, the fact that

the foeda religio

than

human life is utterly meaningless and lacking support, that it lasts
only for a minute which is preceded and followed by an infinite time
during which the human race was not and will not be. (Cf. the beginning
of "On truth and lie in an extra-moral
sense.") These religious atheists,
this new breed of atheists cannot be
deceptively and deceivingly appeased
as people like Engels
by the prospect of a most glorious future, of the
realm of
of

for
we

freedom,

which will

the human race

very long time
find ourselves still
a

Engels, Ludwig

indeed be terminated

therewith

and

for

a

of

all

millennium

by

meaning but
or

more

,

the annihilation
which

for

will

last

fortunately

"the ascending branch of human history" (F.
Feuerbach und der Ausgang der deutschen klassischen
on

Note
Philosophie):
tains

within

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil

on

freedom, destined

the realm of

itself the

its

103

to perish, necessarily con

and will therefore, while
in "contradictions" as much as any earlier age.
Nietzsche does not mean to sacrifice God for the sake of the Nothing,
for while recognizing the deadly truth that God died he aims at trans

it

lasts,

seeds of

annihilation

abound

it into a life-inspiring one or rather to discover in the depth
deadly truth its opposite. Sacrificing God for the sake of the
Nothing would be an extreme form of world-denial or of pessimism.
But Nietzsche, prompted by "some enigmatic
has tried for
a long time to penetrate pessimism to its depth and in particular to

forming
the

of

desire,"

free it from the delusion

of

morality

which

in

a

its

contradicts

way

world-denying tendency. He thus has grasped a more world-denying
way of thinking than that of any previous pessimist. Yet a man who has
taken this road has perhaps without intending to do this opened his
eyes

the

to the opposite ideal

future. It

"perhaps"

the

every kind

a

was

Nothing

or

who

Remembering
reminded

conservative

his

question

doubts

of

seem

unbounded

is.

By

to reveal

beyond the

Yes: the

eternal

saying Yes to everything
himself as radically anti-

wildest

wishes

of

all

other

say No to some of the things that were or are.
"ideals"
"idealists"
Nietzsche's strictures against
and
we
of

Goethe's

suggestion

not

be

again

whether

to Eckermann (November 24, 1824)
idea-like (jedes Ideelle) is serviceable
Be this as it may, "And
Nietzsche

words

"everything

purposes."

concludes

religion

ah

according to which
for revolutionary

is, "would

most

and

was

is Nietzsche may

conservatives,

to the

to be the indispensable transition from

to the

to everything that

revolutionary

belonging

saying that what in some other men was
fact in Nietzsche's thought and life. The

proves

world-denial

of

that was and

are

to the ideal

without

case

the

adoration of

Yes-saying

goes

this,"

regarding

circulus vitiosus

his

shows,

eternal

repetition

of

what

As this concluding ambiguous
is not unambiguous, for he had

atheism

there can be a world, any world whose

God (aph. 150). The

conclusion

and

was

deus?"

of

the

present

center

aphorism

is

not

reminds

us,

through its

form, of the theological aphorism occurring in the first two
chapters (37) where Nietzsche brings out the fact that in a manner the
doctrine of the will to power is a vindication of God, if a decidedly
non-theistic vindication of

But

God.

now we are confronted with

is only the inversion

the fact that the

vindication of

God

the sacrificing of God to stupidity, to the Nothing,
or at any rate presupposes that sacrificing. What is it that suddenly, if
after a long preparation, divinizes the Nothing? Is it the willing of

eternity

which

of

gives

to the world,

or

restores

to

it, its

worth

which

the world-denying ways of thinking had denied it? Is it the willing of
eternity that makes atheism rehgious? Is beloved eternity divine merely

because it is beloved? If

in

order

to deserve to be

into Platonism, into

the

we were to

loved,
teaching

say that it must be in itself lovable,
become guilty of a relapse

would we not

of

"the

good

in itself"? But

can

we

Interpretation

104

Yes, is

says

cannot

an

arouse

to

eternal

Nietzsche

which

even if
Nothing
enthusiastic, hfe-inspiring Yes.

the

the stupidity,

stone,

sempiternal

or

eternal

the

not

For the

altogether?

relapse

a

such

avoid

which

the
world-denying way of thinking into
that
the
divination
stone, the
the realization or

opposite

transformation of the

The

ideal is

connected with

to

Nothing

stupidity or the
"intelligible

which

character"

the

to

will

God is

being

(cf.

power

is in its

sacrificed,

36).

aph.

important ingredient, not to say the nerve, of Nietzsche's
"theology"
which
I have not spoken and shall not speak since I have
of
been worthily treated by Karl Reinhardt in his
It
has
it.
no access to
(Vermachtnis der Antike, Got
der
Klage
"Nietzsche's
essay
tingen 1960, 310-333; see also a remark of Reinhardt at the end of
There is

an

Ariadne"

his eulogy of Walter F. Otto, ib. 379).
It is possible but not likely that the "Sayings
which

the fourth

chapter

consists,

rhyme

or reason

to their

selection

at a

few

are

observations which

The opening

being-oneself, of being for oneself,
Accordingly knowledge cannot be,
it is justifiable only
with

implications. There

God; only
occurs

by

himself. As
and

good

to

being
own

one's

in the

matters

us.

the

paramountcy of
oneself (cf. aph. 41).

be good, for its

or cannot

oneself means

ideal. This

being

sake;

honest

to have

seems

to

references

nine

chapter

own

theology (150). There
(126). Instead we are confronted

to nature

devoted to
mind

a consequence
evil

of

of

occur

a single reference

aphorisms

Nietzsche has in

whom

leave

them points to Nietzsche's own

one of

only

nine

must
some

"preserving"

as self-knowledge:

oneself, going the way to

atheistic

I

helpful to

attention

our

of

order, that there is no

and sequence.

perhaps

draws

aphorism

no

possesses

Interludes"

and

and

in

woman

and

knower

the

Surely

man.

has not, like Kant, the starred heaven above
he has a high morality, a morality beyond

particular

beyond

asceticism.

and

puritanism

his mind, he must
imprison his heart (87, 107). Freedom of one's mind is not possible
without a dash of stupidity (9). Self-knowledge is not only very difficult

Precisely

because he is

concerned with

but impossible to achieve;
edge

chapter

("Toward the
nature
of

man could not

live

of

with

perfect

self-knowl

249).

(80-81, 231,

The fifth

the freedom

the

natural

be the theme

of

central chapter

history

of

is the only

morality")

refers

one whose

to

heading

nature.

Could

this chapter or even of the whole second

part

the book?

Nature

to say nothing of

had been

mentioned more

"naturalists,"

than

once

and

in the first four

"physiology"

chapters.

Let

us

striking of those mentions. In
discussing and rejecting the Stoic imperative "to live according to
Nietzsche makes a distinction between nature and life (9; cf. 49),

cast

a

glance

at

the most important

"physics"

or

nature"

just

as

"us"

be

no

on another occasion

(human

less

natural

he

makes

a

distinction between

nature

life is death

which

than life. The opposite of the natural

is the

beings)

(22). The

opposite of

is

or

and

may

unnatural:

Note

domesticated,

artificial, the

the

(21, 51, 55); i.e.,
In the

Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good

on the

introductory
he had

said

(45). But in the

science

of

practical

with

religiosi

and

the religious

Yet

description,

the

of

to

us

religion, is for

the

most

stating the case for
moralities Nietzsche

when

homines

profound

down, from

above,

an empirical
states

all

have to be

would

study,

the

at

a

same

science

teaches the only true morality. It would seem that he
on the student of religion than on the student

of morals which

higher demands

makes

This is

of morality.

"The

entitled

"The Natural

The

why he did not entitle the third
Hume had written an essay

perhaps the reason

chapter

history
History

natural

of

religion":

Religion."

of

to have discovered the

philosophers'

science

foundation

of

defects

well

of

that pretended

of

claimed

morals

in

either

morals

nature

in

or

it

science

that morality must or can be

sumption

Apart from

reason.

rests

natural

on

the

(according

to

all

as

gratuitous

nature)

Yet every morality is based on some tyranny against nature
against reason.
Nietzsche directs his criticism especially

or rational.
as

reminds

that the true

time the case against the possibility of a philosophic ethics,

other

de

the

of

which

suspect

psychology
for the psychologist

various

anti-natural

speaks

of

of

105

aphorism of the chapter on

he led

experience

the

a manner

the same time to be able to look

at

on these experiences.
a

(62),

Evil

alive.

empirical

impossible,

purposes

familiar

introductory

earlier case

religion, i.e. the

be

morality in

of

in the

religion

well

(186) Nietzsche

aphorism

history

sideratum of a natural

us of what

the misbegotten

the unnatural may very

and

as

anarchists who oppose every subjection to arbitrary laws:
everything of value, every freedom arises from a compulsion of long
duration that was exerted by arbitrary, unreasonable laws; it was that

the

against

permissiveness

long lasting
moral

obedience

imperative

of

to

unnatural

Physis

nature."

of

distinction, nay, opposition of
aphorism (188) Nietzsche speaks
in

nature

one

Nietzsche

As for

case, in the final

the

as

anarchists

he

and yet

the good with

consequences; it is

How the

patrician

(Preface),

whose

philosopher

to

by

do

nature

precisely
is "the

while

nomoi

preserving
Throughout this

nomos.

only in

quotation

nature; nature,

it, has become

a

marks

and not
problem

only
for

withoutt nature.

had

"the

Plato

strength
at

overcome

Plato

and

not

only

by

classic

most

could

is

is the

beautiful

power was

his disposal

surpassing him in
(Twilight of

Its

utilitarian.

riddle; the Platonic Socrates

boring"

and

mention of

understand

cannot

for

calls

physis
of

nomoi

unreasonable

morality, it consists primarily in the identification
the useful and pleasant and hence in the calculation

of

a

and

the

against

that

asserts

rationalist

of

is

Nietzsche

anarchism

the

except

freedom. Over

that has educated the mind to

compulsion
ruinous

the

Socrates.

plebeian

antiquity"

growth

of

greatest which

hitherto

take over the Socratic

a monstrosity.

a

teaching

Nietzsche intends then

substituting his truth for Plato's but also
Among other things "Plato is

strength or power.

the

Gods, 'What I

owe

to the

Ancients'

nr.

2),

Interpretation

106
Nietzsche surely is

while

by,

guided

follow,

or

not

boring. Both Socrates

never

only

but instinct

reason

as

Plato

and

are

well; the instinct

reason. By explicitly taking the side of instinct
Nietzsche tacitly agrees with Rousseau (cf. Natural Right
to that
and History 262 n.). Instinct is, to say the least, akin to nature
which one may expel with a hayfork but will nevertheless always come
back (cf. aph. 264; cf. the italicized heading of aph. 81, the first of

is

fundamental than

more

against reason

the four italicized headings in

instinct is the

that the fundamental
toward

urge

self-preservation

Nietzsche's religiosity, is

is to say god-forming
the

of

sequence

of

presence

also

(cf.
an

instinct"

irrationality

will

to

and

power

13). What

aph.

to

are entitled

we

not,

surmise

say, the

ventured

to

call

instinct (aph. 53): "The religious, that
(Will to Power nr. 1038). As a con

judgement, of the decisive
judgement, there cannot be any
different moralities fit, belong to, different
of

the irrational in the

universally valid moral rules:
types of human beings.

four). We

chapter

the

moral

moral

again of nature, supplying the term again
(aph. 197), he demands that one cease to regard
as morbid (as defectively natural) the predatory beings which are dan
gerous, intemperate, passionate, "tropical": it was precisely the defective

When Nietzsche

speaks

quotation marks

with

nature

almost

of

namely, their

all

moralists

timidity

which

not

reason

induced them to

and

not

nature

conceive of

simply

,

the dangerous

and men as morbid. These moralists did not originate the morality
stemming from timidity; that morality is the morality of the human
herd, i.e. of the large majority of men. The utmost one could say is
that the moral philosophers (and theologians) tried to protect the indi
vidual against the dangers with which he is threatened, not by other

brutes

but

men,

by

Nietzsche

his

own

speaks of

passions.

the herd-instinct

of obedience which

universally innate and transmitted by inheritance. It
that originally, in pre-historic times, that instinct

is

now almost

goes without
was

saying
(cf.

acquired

Genealogy of Morals II). While it was very powerful throughout history, it
has become simply predominant in contemporary Europe where it destroys
at least the good conscience of those who command and are independent
and

where

it successfully

to be the only true morality. More
form it implied already that the sole
is utility for the herd, i.e. for the common good;

precisely, in its earlier,
standard of goodness

independence,
which

they

claims

healthy

superiority, inequality were esteemed to the
thought to be subservient to the common

were

indispensable for it,

and not

for their

own sake.

The

extent

good

to

and

common good was

the good of a particular society or tribe; it demanded
therefore hostility to the tribe's external and internal enemies and in
understood

particular

as

to the criminals. When the herd morality draws its ultimate

consequences

the

very

satisfied

as

it does in contemporary Europe, it takes the side of
and becomes afraid of inflicting punishment; it is

criminals
with

making the

criminals

harmless; by abolishing

the

only

Note

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond

on

ground

remaining

fear,

of

completion and thus make

the

superfluous

the abolition of fear are justified

indiscriminate

identification

Timidity

and

of goodness with

it,

also

democratic

of the

movement

the anarchists and socialists

to which, as Nietzsche

belong,

moralities other

higher than the herd morality were at least known. He mentions
high praise Napoleon and, above all, Alcibiades and Caesar. He

and
with

have

his freedom from the herd morality more tellingly
in
one breath Caesar and Alcibiades. Caesar could
mentioning
to have performed a great, historic function for Rome and to

could not

by

than

be

the

its

reach

would

73).

aph.

107

compassion.

Prior to the victory
understands

by

(cf.

EvU

and

timidity

of

morality

itself

Good

said

shown

have dedicated himself to

function

that

to have

been,

as

it were,

a

Roman history, but for Alcibiades Athens was no more
functionary
than the pedestal, exchangeable if need be with Sparta or Persia, for
of

his
to

own

he

be

from

longer

opposes

men

of

Instead he

expresses

among the brutes

(aph.

of
not

man

Caesar.

They

a

nature

the chapter

the view that

He

202).

man

appeals

teach man the

to

which

commanders, the

an

the

requires

his will,

mere

subjugation

as

of

as

"history":

of

chance,

of nature

reason.

dreamed
in its

of

history

by

the philosophy

form. The

The

to

of

a

also to

to the

spirituality,

evidently
formation

the

rule

of

must

are or

nature.

act,

They

the highest degree according to reason, for they put
the high independent
of unreason, and the high
to

will

of

stand

alone,

the

great

reason

(aph. 201)

is

The turn from the autonomy of the
the philosophers of the future is akin to the trans
to the low.

the worshipping

to everything that

evidently

new philosophers

which

they

rule

preferable

herd to the

degree

the past;

tempted to say, to the highest degree according to

end

2) by

to power (aph. 9):

we are

absolute

n.

subjugation

will

that

are or act

dis

as

will

possess

will

will

chance

and

possess a certain nature.

we

even

must

human

(Genealogy II.

have heard, is the most spiritual
the philosophers of the future must possess that
not

nonsense

true

the

highest spirituality, of the greatest
depends then decisively on men who

Philosophy,

on a

pre-history, to use a Marxian distinction

men of the
of nature

kind

a new

future. Mere

of the

dependent

to the gruesome rule

regarded

tinguished from the

new philosophers,

philosophers

suffice, for the new philosophers

not

of man as

end

hitherto

was

will

great,

future

put

has led to the autonomy of the herd, can
born to rule like Napoleon, Alcibiades

men

be philosophers,

must

and

Caesars, however
order

which

be merely

of phUosophers

an

of

herd morality of contemporary Europe to the superior
leaders (Fiihrer). The leaders who can counteract the deg

however

was

such

of

the victorious

radation

in

Nietzsche

of nature.

literally

counted

morahty

and

greatness.

the opposite nature (aph. 199-200). In the rest

speaks no

must

or

glory

men of

was

reasonable.

and

is;

of

the nothing into the

that

unbounded

Yes

transformation would then also be

Interpretation

108
But

i.e.

becomes then

what

every
merely because
agree

to the irrational

corrective

Genealogy,

preface, nr. 5

of

Plato

It

suffices

rational

190).

aph.

Socrates did

As Nietzsche

knowledge"

is

complexity
distinction

(207),

is. In

evil

and

good

what

in Nietzsche's

chapter

same

than a solution.

(aph. 26); it implies

on a vulgar

of

the

of

Nietzsche

relation

Nietzsche there

cannot

be

man and

of man

ends

these
a

as

man:

other

Socrates'

perfect

a

to be irreconcilable with

to use

of

the

favorite

a

to Socrates.

ahen

to

compelled

retort

for

that

morality because he
any cardinal difference

rational

of

hence

deadly truth;

values

human

are

there cannot

creations.

herd to the

autonomous

his doctrine

agreement with

awareness

Gewissen,

the denial

ah

While Nietzsche's turn from the

is in

or

natural

truth, if

a

is

one

a nature of man:

brute is

and

in this form is indeed

which

as

denies that there is
natural

between Wissen

such

considerations

seems

to say a caricature?

utilitarian

the

a riddle rather

soul"

ophers

(cf.

critique

saying is based on awareness of the fact that sometimes "a
head is placed on the body of an ape, a subtle exceptional

understanding

between

in

says

think that he knew

not

words, "virtue is

scientific

therefore

Nietzsche's

not

a grave exaggeration, not

to see that Socrates was not a

order

(cf.

enigmatic

Furthermore, is

end)?

and

compassion

of

glorification

to remember the difference between the Protagoras and the

Gorgias in
sense

Socrates

and of

cruelty only the indispensable

praise of

reasonable

it

to be

cease

must

one

Or is that

rational?

be

judgement,

the moral

of

be strong, healthy and well-born in order to
to it or even to understand it? Yet can one say that Nietzsche's
of cruelty, as distinguished from Plato's praise of gentleness, is

praise

To

irrationality

the

of

judgement (aph. 191)? Or does it

moral

of

his doctrine

the

of

of

new philos

will

to power,

return:

eternal

how

the demand for something absolutely new, this intransigent
"history"
farewell to the whole past, to ah
be reconciled with the un

indeed

can

bounded Yes to everything that was and is? Toward the end of the
present chapter Nietzsche gives a hint
regarding the connection between
the demand for wholly new philosophers and eternal return; the philos
ophers of

the

future, he

says, must be able to endure the

responsibility for the future
suggestion

regarding

Schwergewicht"

eternal

of

led to passing judgement
of

philosophy,

after

philosophic

Nietzsche's

death,

aph.

in

is
of

handmaidens to
entitled

the

"Wir

the

his

grosste

contemporary philosophers, a sorry
but professors

a serious and proper sense

laborers or, as they
who "do

came to

phUosophy."

Gelehrten"; it is
is

the

"Das

heading

men

philosophy.

personal pronoun

under

weight of
published

341).

the

best case, i.e. only in rare cases,
and honest specialists who of right
or

He had originally

the new phUosophers Nietzsche is naturally

on

who are not philosophers

man.

return

(Gay Science

From the desideration

lot,

of

scholars
ought

The

or

call themselves

They

scientists, i.e.

are

to be subservient to philosophy
devoted to this kind of man

chapter

the only one in whose title the first

used:

in the

competent

Nietzsche

wishes

to

person

emphasize the

fact

Note

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond

on

Good

Evil

and

109

that apart from being a precursor of the philosophers of the future, he
belongs to the scholars and not, for instance, to the poets or the
homines religiosi. The emancipation of the scholars or scientists from

philosophy is according to him only a part of the democratic movement,
i.e. of the emancipation of the low from subordination to the high.
The things

have

which we

in the 20th century regarding the

observed

Nietzsche's diagnosis.

sciences of man confirm

The plebeian character of the contemporary scholar or scientist is
due to the fact that he has no reverence for himself and this in its turn
is due to his lack of self, to his self-forgetting, the necessary consequence
"nature"
or cause of his objectivity; hence he is no longer
or "natural";

he

"genuine"

only be

can

exaggeration, the

some

"authentic."

or

Originally,

the genuine

natural and

were

one can

the

same

say with
(cf. Plato

Laws 642c 8-d 1, 777d 5-6; Rousseau, Du Contrat Social I. 9 end and
II. 7, third paragraph); Nietzsche prepares decisively the replacement of
perhaps

the authentic. That he does this

by

the natural

become

immediately

more

from the

clear

with

to

closer

philosophy and
This in its turn

science.

was

consequence

a

is

function

a

a

man

but

the fact that the

Morning

of

tendency

become

to

the

as

aph.

a

acquisition

History
is

philosopher
of

former

place of nature

no

longer

generations

child of the

as

understood

(aph. 213;

Dawn

cf.

peculiarly

modern

furnishes only the almost worthless materials
of Government II sect. 43).

The philosopher,

as

distinguished from the

man

in

aph.

207); he is

less demand to be

whom

not

only

philosopher

This

in

the

He

seems

characterization
of

the

only

by

what

sense

of

the

remain

Gay Science

creates

the affirmative

sixth chapter on

true that

aph.

belongs to the future
their time.

laborers,
end).

beginning

Today;

with

raises

Greeks

to his

compared

philosophic

(aph. 211

the

contradiction

and

ever were such philosophers

Empedocles. Or does it

philosopher

existence

Nietzsche

and

(The

of

applies, however

the future

are

to have answered that question in

said near

rest

values.

precise

there

but the

the peak which does not permit

overcome.

in the

question whether

of

as

scientist, is the

scholar or

man

strictly speaking only to the philosophers
whom men of the rank of Kant and Hegel

science

takes the

e.g. the natural gifts which

natural

540). Historicism is the

nature

complementary
is justified (cf.

he had

may

that truth

(Locke, Two Treatises

themselves

for the

one

what

to understand everything in terms of its genesis, of its human

production:

still

(country).

and place

as a consequence of

given

of

realization

time (historical epoch) or that every philosophy belongs

of

definite time

enable

with

209). Historical study had come to be
therefore also a greater danger to it than

the historicization of philosophy, the alleged

a

will

concerned

aph.

call

to

He is

the classical scholars and historians than

the natural scientists (cf.

natural

following

why he does this

and

consideration.

we

must

125, 340)? The

and

was

Heraclitus, Plato

therefore

overcome

also

philosopher

as

times

in

at

all

the philosophers were always the bad con

They belonged

then to

their

time,

not

indeed,

Interpretation

110

as Hegel thought, by being the sons of their times (Vorlesungen uber
die Geschichte der Philosophie, Einleitung, ed. Hoffmeister, 149) but
by being their step-sons (Schopenhauer als Erzieher nr. 3). As belonging

to their time and their

the

with

Europe

man

of

excellence

is threatened

which

the invisible

of

in

of

but

general

Russia

by

spiritual rulers

country if only as their step-sons, the
the future are concerned not only

or

Europe (aph. 208): the

a united

its

place

the philosophers

of

precursors

philosophers of

of

preservation

therefore

must

become

future

must

become

the

Europe

a united

the

with

and which

without ever

becoming

servants.

In the
whose

seventh chapter

he

virtues

Europeans

Nietzsche turns to "our

"we

but

there, are not "we
tomorrow, we firstlings

scholars"

discusses

of the time after

"we"

Yet the

virtues."

of

century"

the 20th

philosophers

(aph. 227), i.e. the precursors of the
"we free
of the future. The discussion of the virtues and vices of

the

must

minds"

(aph. 214),
scholars

in the

be

by

supplemented

a

discussion

the

of

and

virtues

the free minds. The virtues of the free minds had been discussed

vices of

chapter

second

must

virtues,

fundamental

but their

ambiguity;

Christianity. One

it

"Our"

say that

inseparable from their

morality is

inspired

is

are

which

vices

be laid bare.

also

by

characterized

by Christianity

by

and

a

anti-

"our"

morality constitutes a progress
beyond the morality of the preceding generations but this change is no
"our"
increased
ground for pride; such pride would be incompatible with

in

delicacy

can

moral

matters.

Nietzsche is willing to

spirituality (intellectuality) is the

it is the

that
are

product

that

grant
of

that it

in the

consists

a

high

moral

qualities,

to

men who

synthesis of all those states which one ascribes

moral,"

"only

ultimate

spiritualization

of

justice

and

that kind severity which knows that it is commissioned to maintain
in the world the order of rank, even among the things and not only
of

among men. Being the complementary man in whom the rest of existence
is justified (aph. 207), standing on the summit, nay, being the summit,
the philosopher has a cosmic responsibility. But "our
are not
virtues"

the

virtues

Nietzsche

the

of

makes

philosopher

to the

men

treating both

him from

identification

of

the

goodness

"only

are

concession

moral"

does

not

utilitarianism)

compassion,

which
prevent

(altruism,

teachings

moral

reigning

with

future. The

the

of

who

as

well

the
as

trivial, not to say with contempt; the
superior morality which flows from that critique or which is its pre
supposition does not belong to "our
The reigning moralities

their

critique

by

moralists

as

virtues."

are unaware of

the problematic character of morality as such and this
awareness of the variety of moralities (cf.

is due to their insufficient

186),

aph.
sense
not
root

is

virtue,

older

is

moralists'

to these

"our"

a

than the

lack

self-criticism

of
of

even

19th

"our

lack

historical

virtue."

century.

self-sufficiency
modernity, its

of

great

It is

of plebeian

a novel

Europe,

for

The historical

sense.

ambiguous

an

longing

It is

phenomenon,

phenomenon.

or

it

something

Its

expresses the

different, for

Note

past

something

barbarians. It
points

virtue,
to

a

of

way

defect,

this

thinking

been

all

by

of the

opposite

("We immoralists"):

immoralism is

our

man

we

of

historical

the

beginning; it

sense."

which alone is left to
is
may say, the positive or reverse
includes and completes "our great

Yet probity is

the phUosophers

"our

by

most

"our"

duty";

of

one

modified, fortified

an

of

the

delicate,

end

than

rather

future; it is

not

a

the

future; it must be supported,
disguised, most spiritual

most

is directed toward the future. Surely our probity
be permitted to become the ground or object of our pride,

power"

to

which

must not

for this
For

with

virtue

is,

virtue characteristic of

wiU

have

who

the abolition

together

goes

"men

are

to the past rather than to the

points

those
on

us"

immorahsm. Probity

our

of

side

between the

owes

immoralists

"Our

virtue.

probity, inteUectual probity; it
virtue

is bent

which

morality

(aph.

of compassion
manner

compassion with

and which

historicism,

the historical

of

to suffering (aph. 225). The
is the only one in the chapter with an italicized

things

great

(226)

next aphorism

heading

its

of

(aph. 219)

the

and

suffering,

boasts

nature

side of our great

that transcends

The discussion

all earlier peaks.

which

morality

neglected

awareness

it

the reverse

living

and

and

plebeian

of

would seem that

to

consequence, "measure is foreign to us;
and unmeasured"; hence we are half-

(aph. 223-24) is surrounded by a discussion
225): the historical sense mediates in a

sense

222

a

111

the infinite

by

higher than

a peak

As

alien.

or

titillated

are

we

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil

on

lead

would

a

with

English

us

back to

better understanding

(and to theism).

moralism

"our

of

it is helpful to

virtue"

the most powerful antagonist, the morality

indeed

preached

contrast

by

up

the

the basis of morality
but contends that egoism rightly understood leads to the espousal of
the

utilitarians which accepts

general

WhUe it

welfare.

That

is disgusting,

utilitarianism

the fundamental

egoism as

boring

and

naive.

egoism, it does not
realize the fact that egoism is will to power and hence includes cruelty
which, as cruelty directed toward oneself, is effective in intellectual
probity, in "the intellectual
To recognize the crucial importance of cruelty is indispensable if
recognizes

character

of

conscience."

"the terrible basic text homo
to be seen, if

is

"that

is to be "re-translated into
task for the future: "there

eternal

a

(Will to Power

nr.

120).

Man

never
must

text"

basic

nature."

man

altogether

humanity"

natura,"

That
was

is

again

re-translation

yet

a

be "made

natural
natural"

together "with the pure, newly found, newly redeemed
(The Gay Science aph. 109). For man is the not yet fixed, not
established beast (aph. 62): man becomes natural by acquiring his

(vernatiirlicht)
nature"

yet

final, fixed
state, its

character.

peak

(Aristotle,

nature,'

to

For the

although

nature of a

it is properly

through

and

in the

end, its completed

phUosopher

speak of

going back but

not a

into the high, free, even terrible nature
of the Idols, 'Skirmishes of an untimely
peak

being is its

Politics 1252b 32-34). "I too

an

naturalness..."

and
man'

of

nr.

48). Man

the future as the

'return

ascent

up
(Twilight

reaches

truly

his

com-

Interpretation

112

plementary man in whom not only man but the rest of existence is
justified (aph. 207). He is the first man who consciously creates values
on the basis of the understanding of the will to power as the fundamental

His

phenomenon.
wUl

the highest form of the

action constitutes

most spiritual

to power and therewith the highest form of the wiU to power.

By

this action he puts an end to the rule of non-sense and chance (aph. 203).

As the

lichung
of

the

of the

act

is

of man

highest form

at

of

the same time the

(cf. Will to Power

non-human

man's

will

peak of

614), for

nr.

Vernatiir-

to power the

the

anthropomorphization

the most

spiritual will

in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be
(aph. 9). It is in this way that Nietzsche abolishes the difference between

to

consists

power

the

world

world

of

appearance

Friihschriften,

Landshut,

ed.

It is however the
and

chance,

brings to its
is

history

235, 237, 273.)
hitherto, i.e.

pp.
of

man

und

conclusion

the

whole

historical

and

the true

PhUosophie', Die

the rule of non-sense

is the necessary condition for the
That is to say, the V ernaturlichung

which

sense and chance.
and

fiction (the interpretations)

or

(the text). (Cf. Marx 'Nationalokonomie

subjugation of non
of man presupposes

process

a completion

necessary but requires a new, free creative act.
Still, in this way history can be said to be integrated into nature. Be
this as it may, man cannot say Yes to the philosophers of the future

which

without

by

no

means

saying Yes to the

past.

Yet there is

a great

difference between
is, i.e. the

this Yes and the unbounded Yes to everything that was and
affirmation of eternal

Instead

return.

explaining why it is necessary to affirm the eternal return,
Nietzsche indicates that the highest achievement, as aU earlier high
of

achievements, is in the last
nature; in the last

"deep

down."

analysis

not

the

work

of

reason

but

of

thought depends on something unteachable
on a fundamental stupidity; the nature of the individual,
analysis all

the individual nature, not evident and universally valid insights, it seems,
is the ground of all worthwhile understanding or knowledge (aph. 231;
cf.

aph.

8). There is

an order of rank of

the natures; at the

summit of

is the complementary man. His supremacy is shown by
the fact that he solves the highest, the most difficult problem. As we
have observed, for Nietzsche nature has become a problem and yet he
cannot do without nature. Nature, we may say, has become a problem
owing to the fact that man is conquering nature and there are no assignable
the

hierarchy

limits to that

As

a consequence, people have come to think
inequality.
Yet suffering and inequality are
abolishing suffering
the prerequisites of human greatness (aph. 239 and 257). Hitherto
conquest.

of

and

suffering
imposed
gruesome

all

men

and
on

man.

rule

are

have been taken for granted, as "given," as
Henceforth, they must be willed. That is to say, the
non-sense and chance, nature, the fact that almost

inequality
of

fragments,

cripples

and

gruesome

present and past

is itself

it is

bridge to the future (cf.

willed as a

a

fragment,

a

riddle,

accidents,

the

whole

a gruesome accident unless

Zarathustra, 'Of Redemption').

Note

on

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil

113

While paving the way for the complementary man, one must at the
same time say unbounded Yes to the fragments and cripples. Nature,
the eternity of nature, owes its being to a postulation, to an act of the
will to power on the part of the highest nature.
At the end of the seventh chapter Nietzsche discusses "woman and
man"

say

(cf.

aph.

237). The apparently clumsy transition to that subject
which he questions the truth of what he is about to

transition in

a

claiming that it
is not merely

by

down"

woman's

theme

expresses
a

emancipation.

nature, i.e.

of

flattery,

merely his "fundamental stupidity deep
a gesture of courtesy to the friends of

It indicates that he is
the

natural

hierarchy,

to

about

in full

the

continue

awarness

the

of

problem of nature.

The

the future may

of

philosophers

Europe is

I'Europe des

still

nations

to a united Europe but

belong
et

des

Germany

patries.

more

than any other part of non-Russian Europe has more of a prospect of
a

future than, say, France or England (aph. 240, 251, 255; cf. Heine
Elster IV 510). One could find that Nietzsche stresses in his chapter

ed.

and

on peoples

fatherlands

than her virtues: it

is

more

not so

the defects

difficult to free

of

one's

contemporary
heart from a

Germany
victorious

fatherland as from a beaten one (aph. 41). The target of his critique
here is not German phUosophy but German music, i.e. Richard Wagner.
More precisely, European nobility reveals itself as the work and inven
tion of
modern

France, whereas European commonness, the plebeianism
ideas, is the work and invention of England (aph. 253).

the

of

the last chapter which he entitled "Was ist
"noble"
differs from
because it is inseparable
from extraction, origin, birth (Dawn of Morning, aph. 199; Goethe
Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre [Sdmtliche Werke, Tempel-Klassiker, II

Nietzsche thus

vomehm?"

87-88]
last

and

chapter

Dichtung
of

(a) phUosophy

hfe;

thus

prepares

"Vornehm"

a
of

und

prelude

Wahrheit, Vol. 2,
to

a

philosophy

the philosophy

of

by

compassion

and

solitude

44-45).

future,
reveals

philosopher
replaces

(aph. 284). This is

it

of

medium

the future

philosophy of the future. The virtues of the
differ from the Platonic virtues: Nietzsche

justice

the

the future as reflected in the

reflected

cit.

ed.

of

Being

the

shows

the

conduct,

itself
of

as

the future

temperance
one

of

the

and

illustration

"Vornehmamong many of what he means by characterizing nature by its
Natur
ersetzt
die
gottliche
Natur.
vornehme
Die
(aph. 188).

heit"