Main Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil"
Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil"Leo Strauss
97 NOTE ON THE PLAN OF NIETZSCHE'S BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL Leo Strauss Beyond Good Evil and always seemed to me to Nietzsche's books. This impression of dicted his by judgement, for he Zarathustra is the most the most perfect in as the "most as same to regard and even To illustrate this partly too far-fetched, there seems to be Plato's Republic, his Phaedrus Yet Plato fundity or no makes beauty is is not regard to perhaps not to the effect that agreement his Banquet in perfect his well as beautiful" an example which general and contra that his are most beautiful necessarily his most profound writings. distinction among his writings in regard to pro their without by beautiful in German exists "most as most believe to language. But "most profound" language." writings inclined was book that profound be the be thought to be could being or perfection in regard language; he is to not concerned "ipsissimosity" and hence with Plato's writings, his but points away from himself whereas Nietzsche points most emphatically Nietzsche." "personally" to himself, to "Mr. Now Nietzsche preferred, with not Plato with Beyond Good Science to "most all "face," What is Evil but his Dawn of personal," or with dimly on being Beyond Good and his ultimately derivative from the Greek "personal" has nothing to do with "perfect in perceived Beyond Good his account of that book Good and Evil is the very Zarathustra in Morning Gay books precisely because these two books are his books (letter to Karl Knortz of June 21, 1888). As indicates, being "profound" judgement " and other personal" the very term for his as and much which is language." he has through expressed our clearly by Nietzsche in in Ecce Homo: Beyond stated given "inspired" the Zarathustra is eye to inadequately Evil, is opposite of as Evil the and and regard word being most compelled to and "dithyrambic" far-sighted, whereas in grasp clearly the nearest, timely (the present), the around-us. This change of concern required form," the same arbitrary in every respect, "above all also in the out of which a Zarathustra had become from the instincts away turning the possible: regards the graceful subtlety as regards form, as regards intention, as the art of silence are in the foreground in Beyond Good and which amounts to saying that these qualities are not in the foreground in the Zarathustra, to say nothing of Nietzsche's other books. In other words, in Beyond Good and Evil, in the only book published by Nietzsche, in the contemporary preface to which he presents himself Evil as the antagonist of than anywhere else. Plato, he "platonizes" as regards the "form" more Interpretation 98 to the According mental that no human only for strive which being wisdom that gods too Plato and reminded proper of Plato, nor and (cf. Sophist 216b of aphorism ultimate the fundamental difference thoughts in their and painted help being cannot we the after Socrates in the when underlines thoughts" between "written form, Evil Nietzsche not gods philosophize And 1-2). 151d and Evil and a super-Socrates especially among philosophers, Yet Diotima is have thought that Theaetetus 5-6, Beyond Good heart" Nietzsche divulges suspect perhaps philosophize. could well the genius of Dionysos god Beyond Good of aphorism penultimate the novelty, preparation mind easily be led to Diotima's conclusion is wise, but only the god is; human beings can or philosophize; gods do not philosophize (Banquet Nietzsche delineates "the is in fact the who the pure of Evil Plato's funda and of the good in and one can premise In the 203e-204a). in his invention was error itself. From this to Beyond Good preface Plato what says original intimates or logos" and regarding the unsayable and regarding the "weakness of the a fortiori unwritable character of the truth (Ep. VII 341c-d, 342e-343a): the purity of the establish the Beyond Good future." the of liberating the Plato conceives Evil has the and of it, does of subtitle "Prelude to a philosophy of the true philosophy, but a new kind of philosophy by i.e. of mind from "the prejudice the of this very fact the book is meant to be a philosophers," At the specimen of same time or the philosophy the future. The first chapter ("Of the prejudices of the philosophers") is followed by Nietzsche's sense past but they a chapter entitled "The free free from the are of mind." prejudice are not yet philosophers of the and precursors of than the philosophers of the future? do only minds in future; they are the heralds the philosophy of the future (aph. 44). It is hard to say how the distinction between the free possible The free the philosophy of the minds and the future is to be understood: are the free minds is necessarily to prepare, not indeed the philosophy meant the philosophers of the past (and the present). by not the logos. The book is future, the as mind strength of during they the by philosophers of any chance freer possess an openness which the transitional period between the philosophy the philosophy of the future? Be this as it may, philosophy is surely the primary theme of Beyond Good and Evil, the obvious theme of the first two chapters. of the past and The book The third chapter is devoted to ("Sayings and Interludes") does not indicate a subject matter; that chapter is distinguished from all other chapters by the fact that it consists exclusively of short aphorisms. The last five chapters are devoted to morals and politics. The book as religion. consists of nine chapters. The heading of the fourth chapter a whole consists then of two main parts which another by about 123 "Sayings and is devoted chiefly to philosophy morals and politics. Philosophy Interludes"; and religion and are separated the first and of the second religion, it seems, from one the two parts chiefly to belong together Note Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good on the and Evil 99 belong more closely together than philosophy and the city. (Cf. Hegel's distinction between the absolute and the objective mind.) The fundamental alternative is that of the rule of philosophy over religion or the rule of religion Aristotle, as a distinguished from lower over phUosophy; it is not, as it plane than intimates that his the classics, either Pascal (cf. religiosus or religion. or precursor par excellence but the homo a philosopher for Plato belongs from the outset to In the preface he is not a statesman nor even politics philosophy was life; for Nietzsche, that of the philosophic and the political 45). aph. Nietzsche says very little about religion in the first two chapters. One could say that he speaks there on religion only in a single aphorism which happens to be the shortest (37). That aphorism is a kind of immediately corollary to the his intention, the particular the character thought. But the from or seen to will or modification of the eros the world takes the place occupies in Plato's Geist). Whatever reine the pure and to proposition within power itself" will forth in the sets compatible with mind" mind according to takes the place of both power philosophizing becomes a mode most spiritual (der geistigste) Accordingly the pure mind. and is striving for "the good in (der eros is not "the pure may be the relation between the Plato, in Nietzsche's thought the eros he that his fundamental of the eros which manner according to which life is will to power is will to power and nothing else. The which in one preceding and unambiguous most straightforward to power: it is the will to power; it consists in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be (aph. 9); it is not love of the true that is independent of will or will decision. Whereas according to Plato the according to Nietzsche the impure mind, mind, is the Good and sole Evil source with of pure mind or certain a grasps kind the of truth, impure truth. Nietzsche begins therefore Beyond the questioning of love of truth and of truth. If we may make a somewhat free use of an expression occurring in Nietzsche's Second Meditation Out of Season, the truth is not attractive, lovable, life-giving, but deadly, as is shown by the true doctrines of the sovereignty of Becoming, the lack of the of any fluidity cardinal Schlechta, I 272); it is of all concepts, types difference between shown most simply man by species, and of beast (Werke, ed and and the true doctrine that "thing-in-itself," "nature" (aph. 9) in itself, the is wholly chaotic and meaningless. Hence all meaning, all order originates in man, in man's creative acts, in his will to power. Nietzsche's state God is dead. The world (aph. 40). By suggesting deadly, he does his best to break deadly truth; he suggests that the most important, the power ments or suggestions are deliberately or saying that the truth is of the truth the truth say that Nietzsche's pure mind enigmatic all truths the most is life-giving. In regarding other words, by suggesting that the truth is human creation, he suggests that this truth at any rate is not a human creation. One is tempted to comprehensive creates perishable truths. grasps Resisting the fact that the impure that temptation we state mind Nietzsche's Interpretation 100 him in this following suggestion hold "text" of the "discover" the philosophers tried to manner: get distinguished from "interpretations"; they tried to "invent." to What Nietzsche claims to have realized as and not is that the text in its pure, form is inaccessible (hke the unfalsified Kantian Thing-in-itself); everything thought by man the is in the last analysis interpretation. But for this of reason very concern to people the text, the us; the world world of in itself, the true concern any for it is necessarily anthropocentric; philosopher anyone world cannot be to us is necessarily a man is necessarily in the measure of ah things (aph. 3 end, 12 end, a of or any fiction, manner 17, 22, 24, 34, 38; cf. Plato, Laws 716c 4-6). As is indicated sufficiently by the title of the book, the anthropocentrism for which Nietzsche opts is transmoral (cf. aph. 34 and 35 with 32). At first glance there does not seem to be a connection 35 between the book which a 34 grave aphorism this seems to agree and of aphorisms does and the lighthearted aphorism impression according to need not have a lucid and the general with not have or necessary order or may consist of disconnected pieces. The connection between aphorism 34 and 35 is a particularly striking example of the lucid, if somewhat hidden, order governing the sequence of the aphor isms: the desultory Nietzsche's character of argument is more pretended than real. If the aforesaid is correct, the doctrine of the will to power cannot claim is "only" many. reveal what regards (aph. 22 the fact, the most presumably the best this apparent objection as fundamental fact but interpretation, among a confirmation of his end). turn to the two aphorisms in Beyond Good and Evil can now I-II that is, interpretation, Nietzsche proposition We to one be said to be devoted to religion (36-37). Aphorism 36 reasoning in support of the doctrine of the will to power. Nietzsche had spoken of the will to power before, but only in the way of bald assertion, not to say dogmatically. Now he sets forth with what is at the same time the most intransigent intellectual probity and the can presents the most bewitching playfulness tempting, hypothetical he does than not what know he his reasons, i.e. the problematic, tentative, his proposition. It could seem that character of more of the will says here. Almost aphorism of the second chapter to power as fundamental reality the immediately before, (34), he had drawn in the central our attention to the fundamental distinction between the world which is of any concern to us and the world in itself, or between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text). What he seems to aim at is the abolition of that to power is both the Precisely if will all views of fundamental distinction: the any concern the world are to us and to all other and the most i.e. at the acts of the same time an fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction the necessary and sufficient condition interpretations, it is the possibility of any is world as will the world in itself. interpretations, to power, the doctrine of the will to power interpretation of world of "categories." Note After doctrine Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good on the having tempted some his of but the devil is refuted the contary, my friends! Beyond Good 150 aph. "Das Wesen der of should not is Rehgion," soul not deal hitherto its and with unknown devoted to manner "Das a of On contrary! to you speak God. of of (Cf. Morals, Preface Nr. 7.) Wesen"; it is not entitled for this and yet rehgion hitherto In the a whole. its boundaries, to the inexhausted being although that the because he deals or 53-57 to the 58-62) section Greeks" the old and above religion of transmits Nietzsche's on rehgion all history certain with are the future. appraisal hitherto he parts of Nietzsche does the future. Aphorisms 46-52 of and whole possibilities: tianity (50-51) of question the whole doctrine one of the reasons the chapter (aph. as Testament' forces vindication Christianity (46-48), then of the Greeks (49), and finally of the Old Testament of the with popularly, that speak "On the what religiose possibilities, the and rehgion rest of rehgion a 30) aph. 101 rehgion, that which is common to ah religions, is not or be of any concern to us. The chapter considers religion with hitherto religion devil, Genealogy as entitled to the human soul a view the The is in as well chapter not. to replies the will to power of Evil and 295, and The third essence And, The doctrine popularly?" He to the Evil makes them raise the to whether that doctrine does not assert, as God is (cf. readers Nietzsche of the will to power and speaks then again of of first Chris (52). "The religiosity of "the Jewish 'Old " supply him with the standards by which he judges of Christianity; nowhere in the chapter does he speak of Christianity with the respect, the admiration, the veneration with which he speaks of the two and on pre-Christian The phenomena. the Old Testament are aphorisms the Old Greeks on to interrupt the aphorisms meant obviously devoted to Christianity; the two interrupting aphorisms are put at some distance from one another in order to imitate the distance or rather opposition between one what devoted to the call may the Old Testament is aphorism on Athens immediately and preceded Jerusalem. by The an aphorism saints, no holy men in the Old Testa Old Testament theology in contradistinction saint: there are no the peculiarity of especially to Greek theology is the conception, the creation of the holy God (cf. Dawn of Morning aph. 68). For Nietzsche "the great of (certain parts of) the Old Testament shows forth the greatness, not ment; style" God, but of man are of what man once was: creatures Nietzsche's being: the the or the will holy to God no less than the holy power. God is then atheistic, at least for the time following that on the Old Testament begins with vindication of aphorism question possible of the human 'Why today?' atheism necessary. But in the There was meantime a time "God when died" Zarathustra, Zarathustra's Prologue Nr. 3). This does theism was (Thus Spoke not merely mean in God, for men's unbelief does not destroy God's life or being. It does mean, however, that even while God hved he never was what the believers in him thought him to be, that men have ceased to believe Interpretation 102 namely, deathless. Theism it as understood itself therefore always was true, i.e. powerful, life-giving. In speaking of how or why it lost its power, Nietzsche speaks here less of the reasons that swayed him than of the reasons advanced by some of his con Yet for wrong. a time it was temporaries, presumably his few of his better readers will directed are against natural the most powerful directed i.e. or revealed those reasons argument theology. Nevertheless Nietzsche which of decay European theism Nietzsche has the impression of is growing powerfully Could phase. "religiosity" present at belong atheism kind while a certain distinguished from as that or atheism to the free is only belongs to the of non-atheism a transitional Nietzsche as mind "religion" conceives philosopher the future who will again worship the god Dionysos or will again Epicurean as an essential might say, to Nietzsche's character of an a dionysokolax (cf. thought; experiment or without you wish, modern seem non-theistic point by was anti-Christian philosophy to religiosity of be, 7)? This ambiguity it his doctrine would lose aph. temptation. a Nietzsche provisionally illustrates his if is sketches the possibility of a clear and unambiguous revelation, "speaking" God's to man (cf. Dawn of Morning aph. 91 and 95). that the religious instinct is its a against Despite the it Not think that those reasons verge not quite clear whether (rational) anti-theistic contemporaries. competent justifiably the frivolous. In particular it is on of most suggestion of an atheistic or, the alleged fact that the whole but not anti-religious that it could to something reminding of the Vedanta philosophy. But he does not anticipate, he surely does not wish, that the religion of the future will be something like the Vedanta philosophy. He anticipates a Western, a sterner, more terrible and more invigorating possibility: the sacrificing from cruelty, i.e. from the will to power turning against more itself, of God which prepares the worshipping of the stone, stupidity, heaviness (gravity), fate, the Nothing. He anticipates in other words that the better what they are bunking of the thing infinitely among the contemporary atheists "the may remind us doing will sun that , more they will come come to know Anaxagoras' stone" of de to realize that there is some terrible, depressing and degrading in the offing or I'infdme: the possibility, nay, the fact that the foeda religio than human life is utterly meaningless and lacking support, that it lasts only for a minute which is preceded and followed by an infinite time during which the human race was not and will not be. (Cf. the beginning of "On truth and lie in an extra-moral sense.") These religious atheists, this new breed of atheists cannot be deceptively and deceivingly appeased as people like Engels by the prospect of a most glorious future, of the realm of of for we freedom, which will the human race very long time find ourselves still a Engels, Ludwig indeed be terminated therewith and for a of all millennium by meaning but or more , the annihilation which for will last fortunately "the ascending branch of human history" (F. Feuerbach und der Ausgang der deutschen klassischen on Note Philosophie): tains within the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil on freedom, destined the realm of itself the its 103 to perish, necessarily con and will therefore, while in "contradictions" as much as any earlier age. Nietzsche does not mean to sacrifice God for the sake of the Nothing, for while recognizing the deadly truth that God died he aims at trans it lasts, seeds of annihilation abound it into a life-inspiring one or rather to discover in the depth deadly truth its opposite. Sacrificing God for the sake of the Nothing would be an extreme form of world-denial or of pessimism. But Nietzsche, prompted by "some enigmatic has tried for a long time to penetrate pessimism to its depth and in particular to forming the of desire," free it from the delusion of morality which in a its contradicts way world-denying tendency. He thus has grasped a more world-denying way of thinking than that of any previous pessimist. Yet a man who has taken this road has perhaps without intending to do this opened his eyes the to the opposite ideal future. It "perhaps" the every kind a was Nothing or who Remembering reminded conservative his question doubts of seem unbounded is. By to reveal beyond the Yes: the eternal saying Yes to everything himself as radically anti- wildest wishes of all other say No to some of the things that were or are. "ideals" "idealists" Nietzsche's strictures against and we of Goethe's suggestion not be again whether to Eckermann (November 24, 1824) idea-like (jedes Ideelle) is serviceable Be this as it may, "And Nietzsche words "everything purposes." concludes religion ah according to which for revolutionary is, "would most and was is Nietzsche may conservatives, to the to be the indispensable transition from to the to everything that revolutionary belonging saying that what in some other men was fact in Nietzsche's thought and life. The proves world-denial of that was and are to the ideal without case the adoration of Yes-saying goes this," regarding circulus vitiosus his shows, eternal repetition of what As this concluding ambiguous is not unambiguous, for he had atheism there can be a world, any world whose God (aph. 150). The conclusion and was deus?" of the present center aphorism is not reminds us, through its form, of the theological aphorism occurring in the first two chapters (37) where Nietzsche brings out the fact that in a manner the doctrine of the will to power is a vindication of God, if a decidedly non-theistic vindication of But God. now we are confronted with is only the inversion the fact that the vindication of God the sacrificing of God to stupidity, to the Nothing, or at any rate presupposes that sacrificing. What is it that suddenly, if after a long preparation, divinizes the Nothing? Is it the willing of eternity which of gives to the world, or restores to it, its worth which the world-denying ways of thinking had denied it? Is it the willing of eternity that makes atheism rehgious? Is beloved eternity divine merely because it is beloved? If in order to deserve to be into Platonism, into the we were to loved, teaching say that it must be in itself lovable, become guilty of a relapse would we not of "the good in itself"? But can we Interpretation 104 Yes, is says cannot an arouse to eternal Nietzsche which even if Nothing enthusiastic, hfe-inspiring Yes. the the stupidity, stone, sempiternal or eternal the not For the altogether? relapse a such avoid which the world-denying way of thinking into that the divination stone, the the realization or opposite transformation of the The ideal is connected with to Nothing stupidity or the "intelligible which character" the to will God is being (cf. power is in its sacrificed, 36). aph. important ingredient, not to say the nerve, of Nietzsche's "theology" which I have not spoken and shall not speak since I have of been worthily treated by Karl Reinhardt in his It has it. no access to (Vermachtnis der Antike, Got der Klage "Nietzsche's essay tingen 1960, 310-333; see also a remark of Reinhardt at the end of There is an Ariadne" his eulogy of Walter F. Otto, ib. 379). It is possible but not likely that the "Sayings which the fourth chapter consists, rhyme or reason to their selection at a few are observations which The opening being-oneself, of being for oneself, Accordingly knowledge cannot be, it is justifiable only with implications. There God; only occurs by himself. As and good to being own one's in the matters us. the paramountcy of oneself (cf. aph. 41). be good, for its or cannot oneself means ideal. This being sake; honest to have seems to references nine chapter own theology (150). There (126). Instead we are confronted to nature devoted to mind a consequence evil of of occur a single reference aphorisms Nietzsche has in whom leave them points to Nietzsche's own one of only nine must some "preserving" as self-knowledge: oneself, going the way to atheistic I helpful to attention our of order, that there is no and sequence. perhaps draws aphorism no possesses Interludes" and and in woman and knower the Surely man. has not, like Kant, the starred heaven above he has a high morality, a morality beyond particular beyond asceticism. and puritanism his mind, he must imprison his heart (87, 107). Freedom of one's mind is not possible without a dash of stupidity (9). Self-knowledge is not only very difficult Precisely because he is concerned with but impossible to achieve; edge chapter ("Toward the nature of man could not live of with perfect self-knowl 249). (80-81, 231, The fifth the freedom the natural be the theme of central chapter history of is the only morality") refers one whose to heading nature. Could this chapter or even of the whole second part the book? Nature to say nothing of had been mentioned more "naturalists," than once and in the first four "physiology" chapters. Let us striking of those mentions. In discussing and rejecting the Stoic imperative "to live according to Nietzsche makes a distinction between nature and life (9; cf. 49), cast a glance at the most important "physics" or nature" just as "us" be no on another occasion (human less natural he makes a distinction between nature life is death which than life. The opposite of the natural is the beings) (22). The opposite of is or and may unnatural: Note domesticated, artificial, the the (21, 51, 55); i.e., In the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good on the introductory he had said (45). But in the science of practical with religiosi and the religious Yet description, the of to us religion, is for the most stating the case for moralities Nietzsche when homines profound down, from above, an empirical states all have to be would study, the at a same science teaches the only true morality. It would seem that he on the student of religion than on the student of morals which higher demands makes This is of morality. "The entitled "The Natural The why he did not entitle the third Hume had written an essay perhaps the reason chapter history History natural of religion": Religion." of to have discovered the philosophers' science foundation of defects well of that pretended of claimed morals in either morals nature in or it science that morality must or can be sumption Apart from reason. rests natural on the (according to all as gratuitous nature) Yet every morality is based on some tyranny against nature against reason. Nietzsche directs his criticism especially or rational. as reminds that the true time the case against the possibility of a philosophic ethics, other de the of which suspect psychology for the psychologist various anti-natural speaks of of 105 aphorism of the chapter on he led experience the a manner the same time to be able to look at on these experiences. a (62), Evil alive. empirical impossible, purposes familiar introductory earlier case religion, i.e. the be morality in of in the religion well (186) Nietzsche aphorism history sideratum of a natural us of what the misbegotten the unnatural may very and as anarchists who oppose every subjection to arbitrary laws: everything of value, every freedom arises from a compulsion of long duration that was exerted by arbitrary, unreasonable laws; it was that the against permissiveness long lasting moral obedience imperative of to unnatural Physis nature." of distinction, nay, opposition of aphorism (188) Nietzsche speaks in nature one Nietzsche As for case, in the final the as anarchists he and yet the good with consequences; it is How the patrician (Preface), whose philosopher to by do nature precisely is "the while nomoi preserving Throughout this nomos. only in quotation nature; nature, it, has become a marks and not problem only for withoutt nature. had "the Plato strength at overcome Plato and not only by classic most could is is the beautiful power was his disposal surpassing him in (Twilight of Its utilitarian. riddle; the Platonic Socrates boring" and mention of understand cannot for calls physis of nomoi unreasonable morality, it consists primarily in the identification the useful and pleasant and hence in the calculation of a and the against that asserts rationalist of is Nietzsche anarchism the except freedom. Over that has educated the mind to compulsion ruinous the Socrates. plebeian antiquity" growth of greatest which hitherto take over the Socratic a monstrosity. a teaching Nietzsche intends then substituting his truth for Plato's but also Among other things "Plato is strength or power. the Gods, 'What I owe to the Ancients' nr. 2), Interpretation 106 Nietzsche surely is while by, guided follow, or not boring. Both Socrates never only but instinct reason as Plato and are well; the instinct reason. By explicitly taking the side of instinct Nietzsche tacitly agrees with Rousseau (cf. Natural Right to that and History 262 n.). Instinct is, to say the least, akin to nature which one may expel with a hayfork but will nevertheless always come back (cf. aph. 264; cf. the italicized heading of aph. 81, the first of is fundamental than more against reason the four italicized headings in instinct is the that the fundamental toward urge self-preservation Nietzsche's religiosity, is is to say god-forming the of sequence of presence also (cf. an instinct" irrationality will to and power 13). What aph. to are entitled we not, surmise say, the ventured to call instinct (aph. 53): "The religious, that (Will to Power nr. 1038). As a con judgement, of the decisive judgement, there cannot be any different moralities fit, belong to, different of the irrational in the universally valid moral rules: types of human beings. four). We chapter the moral moral again of nature, supplying the term again (aph. 197), he demands that one cease to regard as morbid (as defectively natural) the predatory beings which are dan gerous, intemperate, passionate, "tropical": it was precisely the defective When Nietzsche speaks quotation marks with nature almost of namely, their all moralists timidity which not reason induced them to and not nature conceive of simply , the dangerous and men as morbid. These moralists did not originate the morality stemming from timidity; that morality is the morality of the human herd, i.e. of the large majority of men. The utmost one could say is that the moral philosophers (and theologians) tried to protect the indi vidual against the dangers with which he is threatened, not by other brutes but men, by Nietzsche his own speaks of passions. the herd-instinct of obedience which universally innate and transmitted by inheritance. It that originally, in pre-historic times, that instinct is now almost goes without was saying (cf. acquired Genealogy of Morals II). While it was very powerful throughout history, it has become simply predominant in contemporary Europe where it destroys at least the good conscience of those who command and are independent and where it successfully to be the only true morality. More form it implied already that the sole is utility for the herd, i.e. for the common good; precisely, in its earlier, standard of goodness independence, which they claims healthy superiority, inequality were esteemed to the thought to be subservient to the common were indispensable for it, and not for their own sake. The extent good to and common good was the good of a particular society or tribe; it demanded therefore hostility to the tribe's external and internal enemies and in understood particular as to the criminals. When the herd morality draws its ultimate consequences the very satisfied as it does in contemporary Europe, it takes the side of and becomes afraid of inflicting punishment; it is criminals with making the criminals harmless; by abolishing the only Note the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond on ground remaining fear, of completion and thus make the superfluous the abolition of fear are justified indiscriminate identification Timidity and of goodness with it, also democratic of the movement the anarchists and socialists to which, as Nietzsche belong, moralities other higher than the herd morality were at least known. He mentions high praise Napoleon and, above all, Alcibiades and Caesar. He and with have his freedom from the herd morality more tellingly in one breath Caesar and Alcibiades. Caesar could mentioning to have performed a great, historic function for Rome and to could not by than be the its reach would 73). aph. 107 compassion. Prior to the victory understands by (cf. EvU and timidity of morality itself Good said shown have dedicated himself to function that to have been, as it were, a Roman history, but for Alcibiades Athens was no more functionary than the pedestal, exchangeable if need be with Sparta or Persia, for of his to own he be from longer opposes men of Instead he expresses among the brutes (aph. of not man Caesar. They a nature the chapter the view that He 202). man appeals teach man the to which commanders, the an the requires his will, mere subjugation as of as "history": of chance, of nature reason. dreamed in its of history by the philosophy form. The The to of a also to to the spirituality, evidently formation the rule of must are or nature. act, They the highest degree according to reason, for they put the high independent of unreason, and the high to will of stand alone, the great reason (aph. 201) is The turn from the autonomy of the the philosophers of the future is akin to the trans to the low. the worshipping to everything that evidently new philosophers which they rule preferable herd to the degree the past; tempted to say, to the highest degree according to end 2) by to power (aph. 9): we are absolute n. subjugation will that are or act dis as will possess will will chance and possess a certain nature. we even must human (Genealogy II. have heard, is the most spiritual the philosophers of the future must possess that not nonsense true the highest spirituality, of the greatest depends then decisively on men who Philosophy, on a pre-history, to use a Marxian distinction men of the of nature kind a new future. Mere of the dependent to the gruesome rule regarded tinguished from the new philosophers, philosophers suffice, for the new philosophers not of man as end hitherto was will great, future put has led to the autonomy of the herd, can born to rule like Napoleon, Alcibiades men be philosophers, must and Caesars, however order which be merely of phUosophers an of herd morality of contemporary Europe to the superior leaders (Fiihrer). The leaders who can counteract the deg however was such of the victorious radation in Nietzsche of nature. literally counted morahty and greatness. the opposite nature (aph. 199-200). In the rest speaks no must or glory men of was reasonable. and is; of the nothing into the that unbounded Yes transformation would then also be Interpretation 108 But i.e. becomes then what every merely because agree to the irrational corrective Genealogy, preface, nr. 5 of Plato It suffices rational 190). aph. Socrates did As Nietzsche knowledge" is complexity distinction (207), is. In evil and good what in Nietzsche's chapter same than a solution. (aph. 26); it implies on a vulgar of the of Nietzsche relation Nietzsche there cannot be man and of man ends these a as man: other Socrates' perfect a to be irreconcilable with to use of the favorite a to Socrates. ahen to compelled retort for that morality because he any cardinal difference rational of hence deadly truth; values human are there cannot creations. herd to the autonomous his doctrine agreement with awareness Gewissen, the denial ah While Nietzsche's turn from the is in or natural truth, if a is one a nature of man: brute is and in this form is indeed which as denies that there is natural between Wissen such considerations seems to say a caricature? utilitarian the a riddle rather soul" ophers (cf. critique saying is based on awareness of the fact that sometimes "a head is placed on the body of an ape, a subtle exceptional understanding between in says think that he knew not words, "virtue is scientific therefore Nietzsche's not a grave exaggeration, not to see that Socrates was not a order (cf. enigmatic Furthermore, is end)? and compassion of glorification to remember the difference between the Protagoras and the Gorgias in sense Socrates and of cruelty only the indispensable praise of reasonable it to be cease must one Or is that rational? be judgement, the moral of be strong, healthy and well-born in order to to it or even to understand it? Yet can one say that Nietzsche's of cruelty, as distinguished from Plato's praise of gentleness, is praise To irrationality the of judgement (aph. 191)? Or does it moral of his doctrine the of of new philos will to power, return: eternal how the demand for something absolutely new, this intransigent "history" farewell to the whole past, to ah be reconciled with the un indeed can bounded Yes to everything that was and is? Toward the end of the present chapter Nietzsche gives a hint regarding the connection between the demand for wholly new philosophers and eternal return; the philos ophers of the future, he says, must be able to endure the responsibility for the future suggestion regarding Schwergewicht" eternal of led to passing judgement of philosophy, after philosophic Nietzsche's death, aph. in is of handmaidens to entitled the "Wir the his grosste contemporary philosophers, a sorry but professors a serious and proper sense laborers or, as they who "do came to phUosophy." Gelehrten"; it is is the "Das heading men philosophy. personal pronoun under weight of published 341). the best case, i.e. only in rare cases, and honest specialists who of right or He had originally the new phUosophers Nietzsche is naturally on who are not philosophers man. return (Gay Science From the desideration lot, of scholars ought The or call themselves They scientists, i.e. are to be subservient to philosophy devoted to this kind of man chapter the only one in whose title the first used: in the competent Nietzsche wishes to person emphasize the fact Note the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond on Good Evil and 109 that apart from being a precursor of the philosophers of the future, he belongs to the scholars and not, for instance, to the poets or the homines religiosi. The emancipation of the scholars or scientists from philosophy is according to him only a part of the democratic movement, i.e. of the emancipation of the low from subordination to the high. The things have which we in the 20th century regarding the observed Nietzsche's diagnosis. sciences of man confirm The plebeian character of the contemporary scholar or scientist is due to the fact that he has no reverence for himself and this in its turn is due to his lack of self, to his self-forgetting, the necessary consequence "nature" or cause of his objectivity; hence he is no longer or "natural"; he "genuine" only be can exaggeration, the some "authentic." or Originally, the genuine natural and were one can the same say with (cf. Plato Laws 642c 8-d 1, 777d 5-6; Rousseau, Du Contrat Social I. 9 end and II. 7, third paragraph); Nietzsche prepares decisively the replacement of perhaps the authentic. That he does this by the natural become immediately more from the clear with to closer philosophy and This in its turn science. was consequence a is function a a man but the fact that the Morning of tendency become to the as aph. a acquisition History is philosopher of former place of nature no longer generations child of the as understood (aph. 213; Dawn cf. peculiarly modern furnishes only the almost worthless materials of Government II sect. 43). The philosopher, as distinguished from the man in aph. 207); he is less demand to be whom not only philosopher This in the He seems characterization of the only by what sense of the remain Gay Science creates the affirmative sixth chapter on true that aph. belongs to the future their time. laborers, end). beginning Today; with raises Greeks to his compared philosophic (aph. 211 the contradiction and ever were such philosophers Empedocles. Or does it philosopher existence Nietzsche and (The of applies, however the future are to have answered that question in said near rest values. precise there but the the peak which does not permit overcome. in the question whether of as scientist, is the scholar or man strictly speaking only to the philosophers whom men of the rank of Kant and Hegel science takes the e.g. the natural gifts which natural 540). Historicism is the nature complementary is justified (cf. he had may that truth (Locke, Two Treatises themselves for the one what to understand everything in terms of its genesis, of its human production: still (country). and place as a consequence of given of realization time (historical epoch) or that every philosophy belongs of definite time enable with 209). Historical study had come to be therefore also a greater danger to it than the historicization of philosophy, the alleged a will concerned aph. call to He is the classical scholars and historians than the natural scientists (cf. natural following why he does this and consideration. we must 125, 340)? The and was Heraclitus, Plato therefore overcome also philosopher as times in at all the philosophers were always the bad con They belonged then to their time, not indeed, Interpretation 110 as Hegel thought, by being the sons of their times (Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, Einleitung, ed. Hoffmeister, 149) but by being their step-sons (Schopenhauer als Erzieher nr. 3). As belonging to their time and their the with Europe man of excellence is threatened which the invisible of in of but general Russia by spiritual rulers country if only as their step-sons, the the future are concerned not only or Europe (aph. 208): the a united its place the philosophers of precursors philosophers of of preservation therefore must become future must become the Europe a united the with and which without ever becoming servants. In the whose seventh chapter he virtues Europeans Nietzsche turns to "our "we but there, are not "we tomorrow, we firstlings scholars" discusses of the time after "we" Yet the virtues." of century" the 20th philosophers (aph. 227), i.e. the precursors of the "we free of the future. The discussion of the virtues and vices of the must minds" (aph. 214), scholars in the be by supplemented a discussion the of and virtues the free minds. The virtues of the free minds had been discussed vices of chapter second must virtues, fundamental but their ambiguity; Christianity. One it "Our" say that inseparable from their morality is inspired is are which vices be laid bare. also by characterized by Christianity by and a anti- "our" morality constitutes a progress beyond the morality of the preceding generations but this change is no "our" increased ground for pride; such pride would be incompatible with in delicacy can moral matters. Nietzsche is willing to spirituality (intellectuality) is the it is the that are product that grant of that it in the consists a high moral qualities, to men who synthesis of all those states which one ascribes moral," "only ultimate spiritualization of justice and that kind severity which knows that it is commissioned to maintain in the world the order of rank, even among the things and not only of among men. Being the complementary man in whom the rest of existence is justified (aph. 207), standing on the summit, nay, being the summit, the philosopher has a cosmic responsibility. But "our are not virtues" the virtues Nietzsche the of makes philosopher to the men treating both him from identification of the goodness "only are concession moral" does not utilitarianism) compassion, which prevent (altruism, teachings moral reigning with future. The the of who as well the as trivial, not to say with contempt; the superior morality which flows from that critique or which is its pre supposition does not belong to "our The reigning moralities their critique by moralists as virtues." are unaware of the problematic character of morality as such and this awareness of the variety of moralities (cf. is due to their insufficient 186), aph. sense not root is virtue, older is moralists' to these "our" a than the lack self-criticism of of even 19th "our lack historical virtue." century. self-sufficiency modernity, its of great It is of plebeian a novel Europe, for The historical sense. ambiguous an longing It is phenomenon, phenomenon. or it something Its expresses the different, for Note past something barbarians. It points virtue, to a of way defect, this thinking been all by of the opposite ("We immoralists"): immoralism is our man we of historical the beginning; it sense." which alone is left to is may say, the positive or reverse includes and completes "our great Yet probity is the phUosophers "our by most "our" duty"; of one modified, fortified an of the delicate, end than rather future; it is not a the future; it must be supported, disguised, most spiritual most is directed toward the future. Surely our probity be permitted to become the ground or object of our pride, power" to which must not for this For with virtue is, virtue characteristic of wiU have who the abolition together goes "men are to the past rather than to the points those on us" immorahsm. Probity our of side between the owes immoralists "Our virtue. probity, inteUectual probity; it virtue is bent which morality (aph. of compassion manner compassion with and which historicism, the historical of to suffering (aph. 225). The is the only one in the chapter with an italicized things great (226) next aphorism heading its of (aph. 219) the and suffering, boasts nature side of our great that transcends The discussion all earlier peaks. which morality neglected awareness it the reverse living and and plebeian of would seem that to consequence, "measure is foreign to us; and unmeasured"; hence we are half- (aph. 223-24) is surrounded by a discussion 225): the historical sense mediates in a sense 222 a 111 the infinite by higher than a peak As alien. or titillated are we the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil on lead would a with English us back to better understanding (and to theism). moralism "our of it is helpful to virtue" the most powerful antagonist, the morality indeed preached contrast by up the the basis of morality but contends that egoism rightly understood leads to the espousal of the utilitarians which accepts general WhUe it welfare. That is disgusting, utilitarianism the fundamental egoism as boring and naive. egoism, it does not realize the fact that egoism is will to power and hence includes cruelty which, as cruelty directed toward oneself, is effective in intellectual probity, in "the intellectual To recognize the crucial importance of cruelty is indispensable if recognizes character of conscience." "the terrible basic text homo to be seen, if is "that is to be "re-translated into task for the future: "there eternal a (Will to Power nr. 120). Man never must text" basic nature." man altogether humanity" natura," That was is again re-translation yet a be "made natural natural" together "with the pure, newly found, newly redeemed (The Gay Science aph. 109). For man is the not yet fixed, not established beast (aph. 62): man becomes natural by acquiring his (vernatiirlicht) nature" yet final, fixed state, its character. peak (Aristotle, nature,' to For the although nature of a it is properly through and in the end, its completed phUosopher speak of going back but not a into the high, free, even terrible nature of the Idols, 'Skirmishes of an untimely peak being is its Politics 1252b 32-34). "I too an naturalness..." and man' of nr. 48). Man the future as the 'return ascent up (Twilight reaches truly his com- Interpretation 112 plementary man in whom not only man but the rest of existence is justified (aph. 207). He is the first man who consciously creates values on the basis of the understanding of the will to power as the fundamental His phenomenon. wUl the highest form of the action constitutes most spiritual to power and therewith the highest form of the wiU to power. By this action he puts an end to the rule of non-sense and chance (aph. 203). As the lichung of the of the act is of man highest form at of the same time the (cf. Will to Power non-human man's will peak of 614), for nr. Vernatiir- to power the the anthropomorphization the most spiritual will in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be (aph. 9). It is in this way that Nietzsche abolishes the difference between to consists power the world world of appearance Friihschriften, Landshut, ed. It is however the and chance, brings to its is history 235, 237, 273.) hitherto, i.e. pp. of man und conclusion the whole historical and the true PhUosophie', Die the rule of non-sense is the necessary condition for the That is to say, the V ernaturlichung which sense and chance. and fiction (the interpretations) or (the text). (Cf. Marx 'Nationalokonomie subjugation of non of man presupposes process a completion necessary but requires a new, free creative act. Still, in this way history can be said to be integrated into nature. Be this as it may, man cannot say Yes to the philosophers of the future which without by no means saying Yes to the past. Yet there is a great difference between is, i.e. the this Yes and the unbounded Yes to everything that was and affirmation of eternal Instead return. explaining why it is necessary to affirm the eternal return, Nietzsche indicates that the highest achievement, as aU earlier high of achievements, is in the last nature; in the last "deep down." analysis not the work of reason but of thought depends on something unteachable on a fundamental stupidity; the nature of the individual, analysis all the individual nature, not evident and universally valid insights, it seems, is the ground of all worthwhile understanding or knowledge (aph. 231; cf. aph. 8). There is an order of rank of the natures; at the summit of is the complementary man. His supremacy is shown by the fact that he solves the highest, the most difficult problem. As we have observed, for Nietzsche nature has become a problem and yet he cannot do without nature. Nature, we may say, has become a problem owing to the fact that man is conquering nature and there are no assignable the hierarchy limits to that As a consequence, people have come to think inequality. Yet suffering and inequality are abolishing suffering the prerequisites of human greatness (aph. 239 and 257). Hitherto conquest. of and suffering imposed gruesome all men and on man. rule are have been taken for granted, as "given," as Henceforth, they must be willed. That is to say, the non-sense and chance, nature, the fact that almost inequality of fragments, cripples and gruesome present and past is itself it is bridge to the future (cf. willed as a a fragment, a riddle, accidents, the whole a gruesome accident unless Zarathustra, 'Of Redemption'). Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil 113 While paving the way for the complementary man, one must at the same time say unbounded Yes to the fragments and cripples. Nature, the eternity of nature, owes its being to a postulation, to an act of the will to power on the part of the highest nature. At the end of the seventh chapter Nietzsche discusses "woman and man" say (cf. aph. 237). The apparently clumsy transition to that subject which he questions the truth of what he is about to transition in a claiming that it is not merely by down" woman's theme expresses a emancipation. nature, i.e. of flattery, merely his "fundamental stupidity deep a gesture of courtesy to the friends of It indicates that he is the natural hierarchy, to about in full the continue awarness the of problem of nature. The the future may of philosophers Europe is I'Europe des still nations to a united Europe but belong et des Germany patries. more than any other part of non-Russian Europe has more of a prospect of a future than, say, France or England (aph. 240, 251, 255; cf. Heine Elster IV 510). One could find that Nietzsche stresses in his chapter ed. and on peoples fatherlands than her virtues: it is more not so the defects difficult to free of one's contemporary heart from a Germany victorious fatherland as from a beaten one (aph. 41). The target of his critique here is not German phUosophy but German music, i.e. Richard Wagner. More precisely, European nobility reveals itself as the work and inven tion of modern France, whereas European commonness, the plebeianism ideas, is the work and invention of England (aph. 253). the of the last chapter which he entitled "Was ist "noble" differs from because it is inseparable from extraction, origin, birth (Dawn of Morning, aph. 199; Goethe Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre [Sdmtliche Werke, Tempel-Klassiker, II Nietzsche thus vomehm?" 87-88] last and chapter Dichtung of (a) phUosophy hfe; thus prepares "Vornehm" a of und prelude Wahrheit, Vol. 2, to a philosophy the philosophy of by compassion and solitude 44-45). future, reveals philosopher replaces (aph. 284). This is it of medium the future philosophy of the future. The virtues of the differ from the Platonic virtues: Nietzsche justice the the future as reflected in the reflected cit. ed. of Being the shows the conduct, itself of as the future temperance one of the and illustration "Vornehmamong many of what he means by characterizing nature by its Natur ersetzt die gottliche Natur. vornehme Die (aph. 188). heit"